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THE "ENLIGHTENED BARBARITY"t OF INCLUSIVE
FITNESS AND WRONGFUL DEATH: BIOLOGICAL
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AN INVESTMENT THEORY
OF LOSS IN WYCKO V GNODTKE
Ryan Shannon*
Wrongful death laws should permit and encourage courts and juries to consider
the survivors' investment in decedents when determining wrongful death dam-
ages, given new biological justifications for this theory of loss. The investment
theory of damages, which permits an award of damages based on the investment of
financial resources relatives make in one another, originated in Michigan's courts
in the early 1 960s, but as of present day has been largely abrogated. In the context
of modern understandings of evolutionary biology, including kin selection theory
and sociobiology, the investment theory of recovery accords with the goals of correc-
tive justice as it restores plaintiffs to the resource state they were in prior to making
an investment in the decedent and enables plaintiffs to reinvest those same re-
sources in other relatives to recoup lost fitness.
INTRODUCTION
In 1960, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted a novel theory of
recovery for survivors in wrongful death actions-the investment
theory of recovery-which permitted parents to recover the money
spent raising a child to the age of his or her death.' While the opin-
ion was heralded2 as a major break with the Victorian Era
t Powers v. City of Troy, 156 N.W.2d 530, 534 (Mich. 1968) (criticizing an investment
theory of recovery).
University of Michigan Law School, J.D. expected 2010; Michigan State University,
B.A. 2003. The author is grateful to Ashley Thompson, Julia Finkel, Margia Corner, and the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Notes Office and editorial staff for their excellent
research and editorial work. The author would also like to thank Jill Rauh and the staff of
the Benton Harbor Library for their thorough assistance with locating and parsing primary
materials. The author is also grateful to Janet Shannon and the State of Michigan Library
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1. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118 (Mich. 1960).
2. See, e.g., Blair ex reL Brown v. Califano, 650 F.2d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 1981); Elliott v.
Willis, 442 N.E.2d 163, 168 (11. 1982); Boland v. Greer, 422 N.E.2d 1236, 1237 (Ind. 1981)
(Hunter,J., dissenting to denial of transfer); Wardlow v. Keokuk, 190 N.W.2d 439, 449 (Iowa
1971) (Stuart, J., dissenting); Fussner v. Andert, 113 N.W.2d 355, 359 n.9 (Minn. 1961);
Dawson v. Hill & Hill Truck Lines, 671 P.2d 589, 591 (Mont. 1983); Siciliano v. Capitol City
Shows, Inc., 475 A.2d 19, 26-27 (N.H. 1984) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Green v. Bitmer, 424
A.2d 210, 214 (NJ. 1980); Gary v. Schwartz, 339 N.Y.S.2d 39, 45 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Hopkins v.
McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85, 90 (N.D. 1988); Keaton v. Ribbeck, 391 N.E.2d 307, 310 (Ohio
1979); Anderson v. Lale, 216 N.W.2d 152, 156 (S.D. 1974) (describing Wycko as "landmark");
Clymer v. Webster, 596 A.2d 905,913 (Vt. 1991).
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conception of a child's value, which was based primarily on the
child's labor and monetary contributions, courts outside of Michi-
gan almost universally rejected the investment theory.3 Even in
Michigan, the theory had been largely abandoned by the early part
of the 1970s.'
Since the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in Wycko v. Gnod-
tke in 1960, there have been considerable advances in the science
of family behavioral psychology.5 Kin selection theory and the re-
lated notions of inclusive fitness and intra-species altruism give
biological context to the investment human beings make in one
another.6 Moreover, the rising, though controversial, synthesis be-
tween law and biology offers reasons for adopting laws that
comport with basic biological principles.7
This Note argues that wrongful death laws should permit and
encourage courts and juries to consider the survivors' investment
in decedents when determining wrongful death damages, and pro-
poses a new biological justification for this theory of loss. Part I
describes the history of wrongful death recovery and the origin
and development of the investment theory of damages in Michigan
in 1960. Part II demonstrates and develops the proposed reform
and identifies limitations to a theory of recovery based on lost in-
vestment. Part III argues that the investment theory of reform,
when set in the context of modern understandings of evolutionary
biology and human behavior, is in accordance with the goals of
corrective justice. Part IV describes recent scholarship in the inte-
3. See, e.g., Dugas v. Nat'l Aircraft Co., 310 F Supp. 21, 28 (E.D. Pa. 1970) ("Michigan
stands alone in its adoption of the theory that pecuniary loss includes the loss of the invest-
ment in the child as one of its elements."); Kogul v. Sonheim, 372 P.2d 731, 732-33 (Colo.
1962) ("In spite of [ Wycko v. Gnodtke], we have but recently approved [the net pecuniary loss
rule], and no good purpose would be served by an extended discussion here." (citations
omitted));Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 108-11 (Utah 1982) (rejecting not only the loss of
investment theory, but also a loss of opportunity theory advanced by the mother-plaintiff,
who claimed she might have worked had she not spent time raising her child); Danculovich
v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 196 (Wyo. 1979) (expressing concern that rich families can invest
more money in children than poor families, but both experience similar emotional loss).
But see Shondel v. McDermott, 775 F.2d 859, 863 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating in dicta that "[i]f a
child is killed, a minimum estimate of the loss to the parents can be based on the time and
money that the parents expended on raising the child; they would not have incurred these
costs had they not anticipated offsetting benefits.").
4. See D'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14, 20 n.14 (lst Cir. 1973).
5. See generally Catherine A. Salmon & Todd K Shackelford, Toward an Evolutionary
Psychology of the Family, in FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE 3 (Cath-
erine A. Salmon & Todd K. Shackelford eds., 2007); discussion infra Part III.A.
6. See discussion infra Parts III.A, IV.A.
7. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005).
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gration of law and biology, which advocates for the adoption of
laws attuned to human behavior.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EMERGENCE OF INVESTMENT
THEORY IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
A. Wycko v. Gnodtke8
On the evening of August 26, 1957, John Wycko, Jr., his younger
brother, Robert, and three other members of their Boy Scout troop
walked alongside California Road just outside of New Troy,
Michigan. 9 The five members of the newly formed Troop No. 55
had just been dismissed from an evening meeting at the New Troy
firehouse and, early the next morning, the troop had plans to go
to Camp Wilderness, just down the road in Berrien County."0 Situ-
ated at the Southwestern-most edge of Michigan's Lower
Peninsula, Berrien County's sandy soils and lakeside climate
created the perfect environment for fruit farms," and John Wycko,
Jr. spent many of his summers picking berries with his brother on
his father's farm." But on this night, John was with friends, looking
forward to a late-summer camping trip.
That evening marked the first time since the creation of the
troop that John and Robert Wycko had not received a ride home.3
During their two-mile trek, a car traveling in excess of fifty miles-
per-hour clipped both brothers; the driver did not stop.14 John died
before reaching the nearest hospital, and Robert died shortly
afterwards. 5 The two boys were the only children of John Wycko,
Sr. and his wife.' 6 Two hours after the accident, the driver, a seven-
teen-year-old farm boy named Armand Gnodtke, walked into the
Berrien County Jail and surrendered to the sheriff on the advice of
his older brother.17 He had not seen the children walking alongside
the road that night, and after he hit them he considered stopping,
8. 105 N.W.2d 118 (Mich. 1960).
9. Hit-Run Killer of 2 Gives Up!, THE NEWS-PALLADiuM, Aug. 27,1957, at 1.
10. Id.
11. SeeLEw A. CHASE, RuRAL MICHIGAN 206-07 (1922).
12. Wycko, 105 N.W.2d at 125.
13. Hit-Run Killer of 2 Gives Up!, supra note 9.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Mrs. Wycko's first name does not appear in the published case materials, nor in
the newspaper stories regarding the loss of her sons.
17. Id.
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but instead drove home, explaining the damage to the car by tell-
ing his parents he had collided with a post.'
John Wycko, Sr. sued Gnodtke for damages resulting from his
sons' deaths. At the trial for John, Jr., the jury heard John, Sr., tes-
tify that his son was dependable and trustworthy, and that, like
many teens in rural America, he was a valuable worker on the fam-
ily farm.'9 Wycko's counsel asked the trial judge to instruct the jury
to consider "[t] he investment of the parents in their child from the
time of his birth . ,." The trial judge refused to give this instruc-
tion. 2' The jury awarded John Wycko, Sr. $14,000 in damages, plus
$979.50 "for funeral and burial expenses. ''2  The trial judge deter-
mined that the damages awarded were excessive and nearly double
what a fourteen-year-old could have earned. As a result, he ordered
a new trial unless John Wycko, Sr. remitted $6,500 of the verdict
amount.
23
Four years earlier, the Michigan Supreme Court had settled upon
a calculus for determining damages in wrongful death cases involv-
ing minors. In Courtney v. Apple,24 a case involving the death of a
toddler in an automobile accident, the Michigan Supreme Court
determined that damages in wrongful death actions involving mi-
nors should be based on "[t]he difference between probably
contributed earnings, during minority, to a parent, and the cost of
maintaining and educating such child until majority."2 Now, in Wy-
cko, the court faced a case where the jury had made a determination
out of line with that formula, and the justices had a chance to do
away with the "[u] nreal nature of the computation ....
Justice Talbot Smith, who had vigorously dissented four years
earlier in Courtney,7 first reviewed the background of wrongful
death statutes. He started with Lord Campbell's Act,2 which pro-
vided for "such damages as [the jury] may think proportioned to
18. Id.
19. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118, 125 (Mich. 1960).
20. Id. at 124.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 119.
23. Id.
24. 76 N.W.2d 80 (Mich. 1956).
25. Id. at 84.
26. Wycko, 105 N.W.2d at 119 (citing Courtney v. Apple, 76 N.W.2d 80, 87-98 (Smith,
J., dissenting)).
27. Courtney, 76 N.W.2d at 87-98.
28. Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.); Wycko, 105 N.W.2d at 119. For
a more thorough background on wrongful death statutes, see Stuart M. Speiser & Stuart S.
Malawar, An American Tragedy: Damages for Mental Anguish of Bereaved Relatives in Wrongful
Death Actions, 51 TUL. L. REv. 1, 5-8, 17-32 (1976).
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the injury resulting from such death."29 Nonetheless, early case law
in the United Kingdom ° and the mirror statutes enacted by most
states, including .Michigan, initially limited recovery to pecuniary
damages under the pecuniary loss rule.3 1 The pecuniary loss rule
does not recognize mental anguish or the emotional ties between
family members; instead, the rule dictates that "[w]rongful death
damages are measured by the financial contributions ... that the
decedent could have been expected to make to his survivors had
he lived, minus his personal consumption expenses. '
Next, Justice Smith reviewed Victorian-era case law demonstrat-
ing the pecuniary loss rule's effect. Essentially, parent-plaintiffs
could recover if their children worked in factories and would have
returned home with wages.33 Justice Smith observed that the under-
lying justification for this model of compensation had weakened
with the change in the social and economic status of children:
The rulings reflect the philosophy of the times .... It was the
generation of the debtor's prisons, of some 200 or more capi-
tal offenses, and of the public flogging of women. It was an
era when ample work could be found for the agile bodies and
nimble fingers of small children. Defoe's England was not
long past.
34
Calling the lost wages analysis "barbarous" and stating that the no-
tion that it "[s]hould control our decisions today" was a
"[r]eproach to justice," Justice Smith rejected "[t]his remote and
repulsive backwash of time and civilization." 5
Instead, Justice Smith sought an analysis that would compensate
Mr. Wycko, and other parent-plaintiffs for the "[p]ecuniary value
of a human life .... Noting that judges and philosophers have
struggled with the "repugnance" 7 of assigning monetary value to a
29. Fatal Accidents Act § 2.
30. See, e.g., Blake v. Midland Ry. Co., 18 Q.B. 93 (1852).
31. Wycko, 105 N.W.2d at 119; Speiser & Malawar, supra note 28, at 2-7. Speiser and
Malawar also discuss the doctrine of solatium, which awards losses to family members for
grief from wrongful death, regardless of pecuniary loss, and has been followed in Scotland
since before the Fatal Accidents Act.
32. Andrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of Wrongful
Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1, 20 (2005) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER &
KEETON ONTORTS § 127, at 949-50 (5th ed. 1984)).
33. Wycko, 105 N.W.2d at 120; Duckworth v. Johnson, (1859) 4 H. & N. 653, 157 Eng.
Rep. 997 (Exch.); Bramall v. Lees, (1857) 29 L.T.O.S. 111 (Exch.).
34. Wycko, 105 N.W.2d at 120 (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 121.
36. Id. at 122.
37. Id. at 122 n.22 (quoting Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180, 191-92 (1867)).
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human life, Justice Smith nonetheless recognized the duty of the
court to devise a remedy:
The pecuniary value of a human life is a compound of many
elements.... [W]e must consider the expenses of birth, of
food, of clothing, of medicines, of instruction, of nurture and
shelter.... [A] n individual member of a family has a value to
others as part of a functioning social and economic unit. This
value is the value of mutual society and protection, in a word,
companionship.... [Ilt is not the privilege of him whose
wrongful act caused the loss to hide behind the uncertainties
inherent in the very situation his wrong has created."
The Michigan Supreme Court reinstated the original jury verdict
of $14,000, reversing the order granting a new trial subject to re-
mittitur. 9 With its decision in Wycko, the Michigan Supreme Court
became the first state supreme court to approve of the "investment
theory" of damages for the wrongful death of a child.
B. The Reception, Modification, and Partial Rejection ofWycko
Nine months before Wycko, the Michigan Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Elliott v. A.J Smith Contracting Co.40 may have foreshadowed
the court's adoption of the investment theory of recovery.4' In Elli-
ott, the court reviewed an award of $20,000 to the family of a five
year-old, who was struck while crossing the street by the defen-
dant's truck 2 In upholding the award, the court reviewed the
appropriateness of statements made by the plaintiff's counsel,
which were laden with Biblical references about the value of a sin-
gle life.43 Justice Talbot Smith, who wrote the majority opinions in
both Wycko and Elliott, stated:
38. Wycko, 105 N.W.2d at 122-23.
39. Id. at 123.
40. 100 N.W.2d 257 (Mich. 1960).
41. In 1965, Justice Paul Adams noted that Justice Talbot Smith had started the
Court's retreat from the pure form of the pecuniary loss rule in Smith's dissent in Courtney v.
Apple, 76 N.W.2d 80, 87 (Mich. 1956), when Smith "recoiled" from the notion "[t]hat the
value of the life of a child or of any human being is such that there can be a recovery for
funeral expenses and nothing more." Currie v. Fiting, 134 N.W.2d 611, 612-13 (Mich.
1965).
42. 100 N.W.2d at 259.
43. Id. at 269 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (quoting the Bible and alluding to the coming
holiday of Good Friday).
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What, in dollars, was the value of the life of this boy? Coun-
sel's opening words, in the paragraphs complained of, spoke
of his reluctance to discuss the value of life in these terms.
"Now," he said, "I must needs [sic] come to the question of
money." His approach to the value of the life of a child was
couched entirely in biblical terms. ... He could, of course,
have argued strictly in monetary, in budgetary, terms. A child
eats so much per day. He gets sick and must be treated and
nursed. He goes to school and must have books. Upon reflec-
tion, however, are not all those expense items? Is there, in
truth, any money damage suffered?"
It is apparent from Justice Smith's opinion in Elliott that he was de-
veloping an investment theory in the months leading up to Wycko.
While in Elliott he questioned whether expenditures made on food,
nursing, medicine, and education were merely "expense items," in
Wycko, Justice Smith cast these same costs ("[t] he expenses of...
food, ... of medicines, of instruction, of nurture and shelter") as
components of "[t] he pecuniary value of a human life. 45 In both
cases, Justice Smith's opinion won the support of five of the court's
eight justices, and a switch of one vote in either instance poten-
tially would have prevented the investment theory from reaching
the light of day. Opening the way for the court to limit the applica-
tion of his theory, Justice Smith retired in 1961, shortly after
authoring Wycko."
The Michigan Supreme Court did not review the investment the-
ory again until 1965. 47 In Wilson v. Modern Mobile Homes, Inc., a jury
found a trailer manufacturer negligent and awarded Harold Wil-
son $25,000 after his ten-year-old daughter, Jean Anne, was
electrocuted while crawling underneath a camping trailer to
44. Id. at 264.
45. 105 N.W.2d at 122-23.
46. Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society, Talbot Smith, http://
www.micourthistory.org/bios.php?id=83 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
47. See Wilson v. Modern Mobile Homes, Inc., 137 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 1965); Reisig v.
Klusendorf, 134 N.W.2d 634 (Mich. 1965); see also Currie v. Fiing, 134 N.W.2d 611 (Mich.
1965) (affirming damages for companionship but not addressing recovery of lost invest-
ment). The Colorado Supreme Court was the first outside of Michigan to review a similar
theory of recovery after Michigan's adoption in Wycko, though in that case, the investment
theory was rejected. Kogul v. Sonheim, 372 P.2d 731, 732 (Colo. 1962) (rejecting plaintiff's
theory that damages should be "[t]he replacement value of the child as measured by the
cost of infantile hospitalization and care, clothing, support and education up to the time of
the child's death").
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retrieve a ball. " The trial judge gave instructions in line with the
holding in Wycko:
[Y]ou must consider the money value of the life of Jean Anne
Wilson .... [Y] ou cannot shirk this difficult problem of
evaluation .... The money, life-value of a human life is a
compound of many elements.... [Y]ou must consider the
expense of birth, of food, of clothing, of medicines, of in-
structions, or nurture and shelter. And it is for that reason the
court has permitted the plaintiff to testify as to the cost of
bringing up the child from birth up to the age of ten years old
at the time of her death, and also as to the care that has been
given to this child. Moreover, ... an individual member of a
family has a value to others as part of a functioning social and
economic unit.
4 9
The defendant appealed, asking that the court overrule Wycko and
instead use a valuation of damages "requir[ing] deduction of the
companionship, society and comfort received during the lifetime
of the decedent, as well as the cost of procuring the companion-
ship [from the value of total potential companionship]. Instead,
the court reaffirmed the holding of Wycko, concluding that "[a]
parent may properly recover the cost of the acquisition of such so-
ciety and comfort, and a jury is capable of ascertaining such
damages . ... "5 Wilson offered an example of a trial where the par-
ent-plaintiffs were permitted to testify as to their investments in
their child, and the jury was permitted to consider these invest-
ments when determining damages. It was, however, the high water
mark of the investment theory.
Just as in Wycko, and Elliott before it, the court's eight justices
split five to three in upholding the award; the decision in Wilson,
however, generated five separate opinions .5' The court's most jun-
ior justice, Justice Michael O'Hara,53 concurred in upholding the
award, but wrote that he agreed "[t]hat Wycko be reconsidered as
suggested by Mr. Justice Kelly and Mr. Justice Black.",54 Black dis-
48. 137 N.W.2d at 144-46.
49. Id. at 149-50.
50. Id. at 146-47.
51. Id. at 147.
52. Id. at 144.
53. Wilson was decided in October 1965.Justice O'Hara had been the deciding vote in
a case in May of that year that upheld ajury award on similar grounds, though the court did
not expressly use Wycko's investment theory. Currie v. Fiting, 134 N.W.2d 611 (Mich. 1965).
54. 137 N.W.2d at 149. In Reisig v. Klusendorf' which the Michigan Supreme Court de-
cided in May 1965,Justices Kelly and Dethmers expressed in their dissent that the time had
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sented, noting that "Wycko has grown since it was handed down to
bizarre if not monstrous proportions," and that, in deciding Wycko,
the court had not predicted a final argument of the type given to
the jury.55
Over the latter half of the decade, the Michigan Supreme Court
expressed doubt over the future of the investment theory, though
the theory was unaffected in its application by lower courts. In
1968, the court considered whether Michigan's wrongful death
statute allowed recovery for the death of a stillborn fetus. 6 Seven
justices agreed that it did not.'7 Justice Brennan, who had joined
the court as its newest member in 1967, wrote an excoriating con-
currence in which he lambasted Wycko as "[e] nlightened barbarity"
since it sought to reduce the value of human life to the same level
as farm animals or machinery.58 The following year, however, the
Michigan Court of Appeals nevertheless upheld a wrongful death
award of $4,000 to surviving parents for "[t]he loss of investment
for the five years and seven months during which" their son lived. 9
The 1970s marked a sea change in wrongful death damages cal-
culations in Michigan. 6° First, in March 1970, the Michigan
Supreme Court decided Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Company, which
overturned Wycko in part, holding that Michigan's wrongful death
statute"1 did not permit recovery for the loss of companionship. 2
Instead, the court in Breckon determined that the statute permit-
ted recovery for only pecuniary injuries and an enumerated list
of non-pecuniary losses.63 This holding, however, did not prevent
the Michigan Court of Appeals from remanding a case for a
come to review Wycko because "only five of the present Court were members in 1961 when
Wycko was decided, three of those five signing the majority opinion and two the dissenting
opinion." 134 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Mich. 1965).
55. 137 N.W.2d at 150-51.
56. Powers v. City of Troy, 156 N.W.2d 530 (Mich. 1968) (interpreting MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 691.581-583 (1948), superseded by statute, Revised Judicature Act of 1961, § 2922,
1961 Mich. Pub. Acts 416, 522).
57. Powers, 156 N.W.2d at 530.
58. Id. at 534 (Brennan,J., concurring) ("The majority in Wycko tell us, though without
citation of judicial authority, finding by the jury, or even reference to sociological hand-
books, that companionship is obtainable on the open market. If it be so in Lansing or Ain
Arbor, or even in certain sections of Detroit, it is not a commodity generally bought and sold
by the citizens of Michigan.").
59. Estate ofDauer v. Zabel, 172 N.W.2d 701, 709-10 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
60. Note that even as Michigan's wrongful death laws were reformed, Pennsylvania's
federal courts were rejecting investment theory.
61. MICH. CoMp. LAWS §§ 691.581-.583 (1948).
62. Breckon v. Franklin Fuel Co., 174 N.W.2d 836, 840-41 (Mich. 1970).
63. Id. The enumerated losses in Michigan's wrongful death statute then included
.reasonable compensation for the pain and suffering, while conscious, undergone by [the]
deceased" and "reasonable medical, hospital, funeral and burial expenses." MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 691.582 (1948).
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determination of damages in line with Wycko's investment theory
later that same year. Furthermore, Breckon spurred the Michigan
State Legislature to amend the state's wrongful death statute in
1971 to explicitly allow for recovery for the loss of companion-
ship.65  Shortly thereafter, the Michigan Court of Appeals
determined that the investment theory of Wycko was unaffected by
the decision in Breckon, characterizing the measure of loss not as
companionship, but rather as the pecuniary cost of acquiring the
companionship of the decedent.66 Conceivably, under the 1971
amendment a parent-plaintiff could simultaneously pursue recov-
ery under both the investment theory for pecuniary loss and the
statute for the non-pecuniary loss of companionship. This has not
been the case: plaintiffs and courts have adopted companionship
as the dominant rubric for analyzing loss in wrongful death
actions. As the First Circuit noted in DAmbra v. United States.
Wycko has not been followed, to our knowledge, in other ju-
risdictions as to the "lost investment" theory; in fact, the
emphasis in Michigan has been more on the loss of society
and companionship ... which we adopt herein. Moreover, to
the extent that a proper balance might be struck by a mini-
mum recovery (to assure a recovery for the loss of a very
young child) supplemented by proof of "lost investment" such
a resolution is particularly within the province of the legisla-
ture.6"
II. THE PROPOSED REFORM
This Note proposes that state legislatures should amend wrong-
ful death statutes to explicitly adopt the loss of investment theory
of recovery for wrongful death actions. The investment theory of
64. Haupt v. Yale Rubber Co., 185 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (overturn-
ing a jury award of $40,000 for the wrongful death of a seven-year-old as inconsistent with
the record and stating that "[u]pon remand, some of the relevant factors to be considered
in determining pecuniary loss include, but are not limited to, the following: Expenses of
birth, of food, of clothing, of medicine, of instruction, of nurture, of care and shelter, and
loss of services.").
65. Act ofJuly 28, 1971, No. 65, 1971 Mich. Pub. Acts 111-12; Estate of Scottv. Burger
King Corp., 291 N.W.2d 174, 177-78 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) ("The 1971 amendment to the
act expressly added loss of society and companionship to the items of damages, thereby
enacting the case law that had begun with Wycko, which had interpreted 'pecuniary loss' to
include companionship." (citation omitted)).
66. Rohm v. Stroud, 192 N.W.2d 388, 389 & n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
67. 481 F.2d 14 (lst Cir. 1973).
68. Id. at 20 n.14 (citation omitted).
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recovery, as that term is used in this Note, provides a system of de-
termining and awarding damages to survivors based on their
investment in the decedent. In order to recover the investment,
this theory requires merely that survivors present evidence of their
expenditures-the financial resources-that they devoted to the
decedent. Justice Smith's formulation is a part of this definition,
and proposes that this value is a proxy for the value of the lost
pieces of survivors' "functioning social and economic unit," and a
proxy for their lost companionship. Rather than present jurors or
judges with the task of a nebulous determination under the rubric
of lost companionship, the investment theory instead presents a
simple and straightforward formula for fixing the damages of sur-
viving relatives.
The adoption of the investment theory of recovery can be ef-
fected either by a legislative overhaul of states' wrongful death
statutes, or by an expanded interpretation of an already enumer-
ated form of damage calculation. The Michigan Supreme Court's
determination that the loss of parental investment was a type of
"pecuniary injury" in Wycko is an example of the latter, as Justice
Smith explicitly noted that Wycko was "[r] estricting the losses to
pecuniary losses, the actual money value of the life of the
child. ... ,,69 The Michigan Supreme Court, however, struggled
with this interpretation for years, even in the face of legislative si-
lence. 70 Naturally, narrow statutes require plaintiffs to push the
square peg of investment theory into the round hole of "pecuniary
,,71loss," "solatium, or some other form of enumerated injury, as was
the case in Wycko. But in some jurisdictions, the language govern-
ing the classes of recovery in wrongful death actions is broad. In
jurisdictions permitting "such damages as [the jury] may think
proportioned to the injury" or some other approximation of the
broad language from Lord Campbell's Act,72 the statutory lan-
guage, if not the court, welcomes new theories of recovery.73
Statutory amendment is the most clear-cut path to the adoption
of investment theory. The following is an excerpt from Michigan's
current wrongful death statute listing recoverable damages, and
the bracketed material demonstrates the proposed reform:
69. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118, 123 (Mich. 1960).
70. See Crystal v. Hubbard, 324 N.W.2d 869, 878 (Mich. 1982) ("[It marked neither
the beginning nor the end ofjudicial debate over the appropriateness of attributing to the
Legislature agreement with the broaderjudicial interpretation of 'pecuniary injury' ......
71. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-21-203.5 (2008); see also discussion supra note 31.
72. Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.).
73. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 377.61 (West 2009) (California's wrongful death
statute) ("In an action under this article, damages may be awarded that, under all the cir-
cumstances of the case, may be just ... ").
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In every action under this section, the court orjury may award
damages as the court or jury shall consider fair and equitable,
under all the circumstances including reasonable medical,
hospital, funeral, and burial expenses for which the estate is
liable [and compensation for the loss of reasonable invest-
ment in the decedent by another, including but not limited to
the expense of birth, of food, of clothing, of medicines, of in-
struction, of nurture and shelter]; reasonable compensation
for the pain and suffering, while conscious, undergone by the
deceased person during the period intervening between the
time of the injury and death; and damages for the loss of fi-
nancial support and the loss of the society and
companionship of the deceased.4
Currently, the Michigan statute limits recovery to the decedent's
"spouse, children, descendants, parents, grandparents, brothers
and sisters., 75 There is no reason for the statute to limit recovery to
any class of relatives, however, because the amount of recovery un-
der the investment theory would be relative to each individual
family member's ability to demonstrate their pecuniary investment
in securing the decedent's companionship. The expectation is that
distant relatives will invest a minimal amount in the first instance,
and the requirement that their investment is "reasonable" will nec-
essarily limit their recovery. The additional onus of showing
evidence of their investment will present a practical bar to their
recovery even if the statute does not. Moreover, by leaving the class
of potential plaintiffs open, the statute would dispel criticisms that
74. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922(6) (Lexis 2004). As a second example, the follow-
ing is an excerpt from New York's wrongful death statute:
The damages awarded to the plaintiff may be such sum as the jury or, where issues of
fact are tried without ajury, the court or referee deems to be fair and just compensa-
tion for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent's death to the persons for
whose benefit the action is brought. In every such action, in addition to any other
lawful element of recoverable damages, [the reasonable costs of investment in the
decedent by another, including but not limited to the expense of birth, of food, of
clothing, of medicines, of instruction, of nurture and shelter], the reasonable ex-
penses of medical aid, nursing and attention incident to the injury causing death and
the reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent paid by the distributees, or for the
payment of which any distributee is responsible, shall also be proper elements of
damage.
N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3(a) (McKinney 1999).
75. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2922(3) (2004). California's statute extends recovery to
those "[wiho would be entitled to the property of the decedent by intestate succession."
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 3 7 7.60(a) (West 2009). The laws of intestacy are in accord, to some
degree, with kin selection theory. See infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
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it leaves non-relative, adoptive parents in the lurch when another is
responsible for the death of their child.
The proposed reform also counters concerns that wealthy par-
ents will recover considerably larger damage awards than poor
parents by allowing for the recovery of only "reasonable invest-
ment." To further combat potential inequalities, courts could
permit external evidence showing the average cost of raising a
child to the age of majority as evidence of the reasonableness of
the investment, 76 and recovery could be based on this cost, pro-
rated to the age of the child at death.
While Justice Smith's original formula presented investment
theory as a pure proxy for "companionship," the proposed reform
need not displace "companionship" as it exists in the statute.
Michigan's courts have looked, in some instances, to the quality of
a family relationship-rather than the amount invested in that re-
lationship-to determine its value to the survivor, and have
indicated that damages can include the loss of future companion-
ship.77 While a survivor claimant would certainly realize the bulk of
the value of "companionship" under the investment theory, the
preservation of that term in the statute permits the jury to increase,
at its discretion, an award to capture the intangible remainder ex-
isting in the quality of the emotional, rather than functional,
relationship. Moreover, certain investments, especially those re-
lated to nursing and care in the home, will not have a readily
provable receipt value for the survivor to present as evidence in the
court.'8 Leaving companionship in place as an avenue to recovery
empowers juries to capture these types of intangible losses.
More important, perhaps, than the methods by which state legis-
latures might adopt the reform, are the underlying justifications
for doing so. In the next section, this Note posits that the
justifications for an adoption of investment theory come from an
integrated understanding of biology and law.
76. MARK LiNo, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., Misc. PUB. No. 1528-2006, EXPENDITURES ON
CHILDREN BY FAMILIES (2006).
77. See McTaggart v. Lindsey, 509 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding
the trial court's reduced damages for companionship to a parent who had "[a]lmost com-
pletely shirked his parental duties"); Claim of Carr, 471 N.W.2d 637, 640 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991) ("There is, of course, no precise formula for determining damages for loss of a loved
one's society and companionship.... The only reasonable measure of the actual destruction
caused is to assess the ... relationship ... in terms of objective behavior ... ."); Lamson v.
Martin, 451 N.W.2d 601, 602 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) ("[Tlhe very concept of 'loss of compan-
ionship' suggests damages that occur in the future.").
78. The survivor might, for example, present their investment of time spent singing
lullabies to a baby under the rubric of "companionship" rather than "investment."
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III. INVESTMENT AND BIOLOGY: FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
AND THE INTERSECTION WITH LAW
Modern understandings of evolutionary biology justify the adop-
tion of investment theory in wrongful death actions. There is little
reason, however, to incorporate these biological justifications into
the language of the proposed reform. The jury's quantification of
the loss of damages is dependent only on the plaintiffs ability to
demonstrate past monetary investment-not their ability to dem-
onstrate how those terms relate to the biological impetus for those
investments. Such integration would likely cause controversy and
unnecessarily stymie the presentation of evidence at trial by requir-
ing testimony from psychological and social theory experts. The
biological justification is not a requirement or even a desired com-
ponent of the reform, but merely a buttressing argument for its
adoption.
A. The Concepts of Fitness and Family
A counterargument often raised to the investment theory of re-
covery is that the duty to expend resources to raise a child
terminates with the child's death, and therefore the pecuniary
situation of the parent-plaintiff is actually improved by the relief of
that duty.7 9 But this theory of pecuniary value misses perhaps the
most basic biological truth, a truth that Wycko danced around as it
upheld an investment theory of recovery: children are valuable to
parents, or more generally, relatives are valuable to one another.
Wycko's pronouncement-that "an individual member of a family
has a value to others as part of a functioning social and economic
unit"s--could have easily come directly out of an evolutionary bi-
ology textbook.8 '
In evolutionary biology, the term "fitness" describes an organ-
ism's ability to successfully reproduce its genes in its environment.
2
79. See, e.g., Goad v. Evans, 547 N.E.2d 690, 705-06 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); cf Grand
Trunk W. Ry. v. Gilpin, 208 F. 126, 130 (7th Cir. 1913) ("It is complained that the trial judge
erred in omitting to charge the jury to deduct from the value of the services of the wife her
cost of maintenance to the husband.... It is true the husband is legally bound to provide
suitable clothing and maintenance for his wife, but this duty affords no presumption of
fact.").
80. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118,122 (Mich. 1960).
81. See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION 193-95 (Canto ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) (1958).
82. JOHN ALCOCK, THE TRIUMPH OF SOCIOBIOLOGY 24 (2001); Elliott Sober, The Two
Faces of itness, in 2 THINKING ABOUT EVOLUTION: HISTORICAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 309, 309 (Rama Shankar Singh et al. eds., 2001) ("Fitness was used
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Fitness is most affected by mechanisms of natural selection that
operate on genes and behaviors influencing reproductive success,
that is, genes and behaviors in parents that improve or impair the
quantity and viability of their children.83 Fitness does not, however,
stop with direct lineage; "inclusive fitness" is another measure of an
organism's ability to promote the presence of its genes in its envi-
ronment, and can be facilitated through seemingly altruistic
behavior toward siblings and other relatives.84 Together, parental
care behaviors and altruistic behaviors by relatives fall into what
biologists term "kin selection," since in both instances, the relative
increases the viability of a kin-member, resulting in a reciprocal
increase in its own fitness.85
The study of human behavior within the framework of evolu-
tionary biology goes by many names. Among these are the
connected fields of "biocultural evolution, 6 "human behavioral
ecology,"8 7 "evolutionary psychology,"8  and more broadly, the field
to describe an organism's vigor, or the degree to which organisms 'fit' into their environ-
ments.... Success concerns not just the robustness of offspring but their number. As a
result, we now regard viability and fertility as two components of fitness.").
83. David C. Queller & Joan E. Strassmann, Quick Guide: Kin Selection, 12 CURRENT
BIOLOGY R832 (2002). For an in-depth explanation of parental investment, see Robert L.
Trivers, Parental Investment and Sexual Selection, in SEXUAL SELECTION AND THE DESCENT OF
MAN: THE DARWINIAN PIVOT 136, 136 (Bernard G. Campbell ed., 2006) (1972).
84. Richard L. Michalski & Harald A. Euler, Evolutionary Perspectives on Sibling Relation-
ships, in FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: AN EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE 185, 187-88 (Catherine A.
Salmon & Todd K. Shackelford eds., 2008); see also Lawrence S. Sugiyama, Physical Attractive-
ness in Adaptationist Perspective, in THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 292,
295-303 (David M. Buss ed., 2005) ("Juveniles differ in their social value to ... parents ...
in their probable value as reproductively successful descendants.... In parentally investing
species, we expect adaptations that generate parental allocation of resources.., in response
to ... the probability that the juvenile will be able to translate investment into future repro-
ductive success.... ."). See generally ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1985).
85. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 107 (3d ed. 2006) ("The truth is that all ex-
amples of child-protection and parental care ... are examples of the working in nature of
the kin-selection principle. The critics are of course familiar with the widespread existence
of parental care, but they fail to understand that parental care is no less an example of kin
selection than brother/sister altruism."); Salmon & Shackelford, supra note 5, at 5-6.
86. See, e.g.,JOHN H. BODLEY, ANTHROPOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY HUMAN PROBLEMS
26 (5th ed. 2007) ("Biocultural evolution involves changes through time in the frequency of
either genes or cultural information in human societies. Like biological reproduction and
genetic transmission, cultural transmission is the most basic evolutionary process that pro-
duces changes in the frequency of the basic cultural ideas that help produce human
behavior.").
87. See, e.g., Lee Cronk, Human Behavioral Ecology, 20 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 25, 25
(1991) ("Human behavioral ecology may be defined as the study of the evolutionary ecology
of human behavior.").
88. See, e.g., Leda Cosmides et al., Introduction: Evolutionary Psychology and Conceptual In-
tegration, in THE ADAPTED MIND 3, 3 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1995) ("Evolutionary
psychology is simply psychology that is informed by the additional knowledge that evolu-
tionary biology has to offer, in the expectation that understanding the process that designed
the human mind will advance the discovery of its architecture.").
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of "sociobiology," which encompasses in some sense all three of the
aforementioned fields.89 These different disciplines posit, and de-
pend on, the notion that the development of animal behavior,
including human behavior, is linked to that behavior's effect on
individual fitness:
[N]either sociobiology nor evolutionary psychology requires
that humans be . .. self-consciously desirous of achieving
personal genetic success .... [A] nimals, ourselves included,
need not be alert to the ultimate evolutionary consequences
of one's desires in order to behave in ways that tend to
increase the production of offspring.... [WIhen a human
smacks his lips at the sight of a large hamburger on the bar-
becue grill, we can be certain that [he is not] motivated to
consume these calorie-rich items by a proximate desire to
advance his reproductive success. However, variation
among.., humans in the past in their desire to consume
high-calorie foods almost certainly had reproductive conse-
quences, thereby affecting the evolution of the proximate
food preferences currently present ....90
The pursuit and accumulation of wealth "tends broadly to be con-
sistent with the proximate goals that lead to reproductive
success, ' 91 and the ability to capture and control resources is a pre-
dictor of reproductive success. In humans, where financial wealth
can be seen as a proxy for these resources, it is likely that individu-
als will adopt behaviors leading to an increased capacity for
obtaining wealth, to the extent that these behaviors do not inter-
fere with others that increase fecundity.
92
Though muddled by the rapidly changing environments in
which humans have lived in the last hundred thousand years, the
ability to control resources still has an apparent effect on parents'
ability to raise numerous and viable offspring in the modern world.
89. ALCOCK, supra note 82, at 24.
90. Id. at 26-27.
91. Jonathan Wells & Simon Strickland, Biological Ends and Human Social Information
Transmission, in SOCIAL INFORMATION TRANSMISSION AND HUMAN BIOLOGY 97, 11 (Jona-
than Wells et al. eds., 2006).
92. See Bobbi S. Low, Sex, Wealth, and Fertility: Old Rules, New Environments, in ADAPTA-
TION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 323, 323 (Lee Cronk et
al. eds., 2000) ("Males who get control of unusually large or rich resources have more off-




The investment is typically large 93 and large enough that both par-
ents share an interest in preventing their spouse from procreating
with other partners, because it diverts funds away from shared off-. 94
spring. Families have an average expenditure of roughly $200,000
over the minority years of a child, and perhaps more than that
when the investments of other relatives are considered.9' Of course,
many human behaviors prove maladaptive, and other behaviors are
difficult to contextualize due to rapid social and environmental
shifts over the last ten thousand years.96 Nonetheless, the effect of
selection on child-rearing behaviors remains strong since it has di-
rect consequences for reproductive success. The biological impetus
for a parent's love and financial investment in children is to raise
offspring that will, in turn, prove reproductively successful when
the children reach adulthood.97
By the time children reach the age of majority they have become
their parents' most valuable assets. And as one would expect, legal
parenthood, with its attached rights to direct investment and be-
havior habituation, is typically a valuable state to natural parents; 8
one need look no further than custody cases in family court to see
how parents will struggle to maintain control over their children.
Professor of political philosophy Hillel Steiner has suggested that
parents are in fact owners of their children, at least for the first few
93. For a detailed breakdown of the cost of raising a child to the age of majority, see
LINO, supra note 76, at iii ("Depending on age of the child, the [annual] expenses range ...
from $10,600 to $11,660 for families in the middle-income group .... ").
94. See DAWKINS, supra note 85, at 146-50. See generally David J. Herring, Child Placement
Decisions: The Relevance of Facial Resemblance and Biological Relationships, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 387
(2003) (proposing that, since men unconsciously look to facial resemblance as a way of
preventing cuckoldry in investing in children, child welfare decision makers should consider
facial resemblance when placing children).
95. LINO, supra note 76, at ii.
96. Jerome H. Barkow et al., New Theoretical Approaches to Cultural Phenomena, in THE
ADAPTED MIND 625, 625-26 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1995) ("Why does human behav-
ior appear to be functionally patterned in some respects, but obviously nonfunctional, or
even maladaptive, in others? The answer lies in the fact that mechanisms designed to per-
form well under one set of conditions will often perform poorly under changed conditions.
Our adaptations were designed (i.e., selected) to operate in the Pleistocene context in
which they evolved .... "); cf Low, supra note 92, at 323 ("Even in monogamous, late-
marrying societies.., resource acquisition aided fertility.").
97. SMITH, supra note 81.
98. David Archard, What's Blood Got to Do with It?: The Significance of Natural Parenthood,
I REs PUBLICA 91, 98 (1995). ("A ... reason for thinking that natural parents should be
legal or social parents is that they are the best suited to care for their own children. Biology
disposes them to love their offspring, and to make sacrifices on their behalf. This is a power-
ful and influential claim. It also has a great deal of plausibility."). Archard notes, however,
that "[iut is clear that natural parents need not be good parents. The widespread incidence
of child abuse is sufficient proof of that. Nor need natural parents be the only good parents.
Adoptive and foster parents can be, and frequently are, lovingly devoted to the children they
care for." Id.
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years of the children's lives, since parents provide for the means of
production while the child is without means to provide for itself99
There is space within the concept to argue that a lack of parental
investment-neglect, for example-terminates the parent's "own-
ership" and his or her ability to direct behavioral decisions
affecting his or her fitness.
Broadening the analysis to incorporate inclusive fitness, it is
clear that surviving brothers and sisters, and perhaps those even
further down the family tree, experience loss as well. It is both
common sense and long-settled zoological theory that siblings in-
vest time and resources in one another's success, and recoup
considerable benefits, both genetic and social, as a result of those
investments. °00 Parents with multiple children have to apportion
limited resources, and their children incur costs to their direct fit-
ness as a result of being raised alongside additional siblings.' ° For
brothers and sisters, who vie against one another for their parents'
limited resources and simultaneously strive to buoy one another's
fitness,10 2 the void left by the death of a sibling displaces a critical
element in the "functioning social and economic unit."'0 ' This is an
underlying reason for the increased success of kinship foster care,
and why child welfare decision makers prefer to place foster chil-
dren with older siblings when possible.' 4
Social biologists have run into problems when trying to explain
the family behaviors associated with adoptive parenting, since the
genetic tie, which in theory is the underlying basis for the direction
99. Hillel Steiner, Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Talent Differentials and Distributive Jus-
tice, in THE GENETIC REVOLUTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 133, 139-40 (Justine Burley ed.,
1999).
100. See Queller & Strassman, supra note 83, at R832 ("Selection normally favors a gene
if it increases reproduction, because the offspring share copies of that gene, but a gene can
also be favored if it aids other relatives, who also share copies."); Stuart A. West, Andy Gard-
ner & Ashleigh S. Griffin, Quick Guide: Altruism, 16 CURRENT BIOLOGY R482 (2006) ("[K]in
selection theory provides an explanation for altruism between relatives. By helping a close
relative reproduce, an individual still passes on its own genes to the next generation, albeit
indirectly. So from the point of view of the gene, an altruistic behaviour can be selfish.").
101. Hillard S. Kaplan & Steven W. Gangestad, Life History Theory and Evolutionary Psy-
chology, in THE H4ANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 68, 72 (David M. Buss ed., 2005)
("[P]arents have limited resources to invest in reproduction and, hence, additional off-
spring must reduce average investment per offspring.").
102. DAWKINS, supra note 85, at 128.
103. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118,122 (Mich. 1960).
104. David J. Herring, Kinship Foster Care: Implications of Behavioral Biology Research, 56
BUFF. L. REV. 495, 524 (2008) ("[A] fundamental component of evolutionary theory, inclu-
sive fitness, allows one to formulate a hypothesis that children are likely to receive better
treatment in kinship foster care placements than in non-kin placements.... On average,
close kin are likely to invest more and provide more benefits than more distant kin."); see
alsoJune Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child Relationship in
an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 1011, 1025-39 (2003).
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of parental behavior, does not exist. One explanation is that strong
"parental and cultural desires" have led to an increase in adoptions
in modern times. Evidence shows adoption rarely occurred in
human history before the modern era, but there is a dearth of evo-
lutionary studies seeking to explain the phenomenon.1 °6 The vast
majority of parenting behavior is triggered by external cues; par-
ents' response mechanisms in past environments resulted in
"parental investment in genetic offspring, but these same mecha-
nisms can be redirected toward nongenetic offspring in the novel
environments of today."0 7 Regardless of the origin of the desire to
invest, an adoptive parent still makes an investment in line with his
or her willingness to provide. Because a state's public interest in
the welfare of children is furthered by adoption,1 and because
there is no strong policy or adequate moral argument for limiting
recovery to genetic relatives, individuals who choose to make in-
vestments in non-related children should also be able to recover
under the investment theory.
B. The Law and Biology Movement
There has been significant scholarship in recent years over the
interplay between the evolutionary basis for human behaviors and
105. Catherine A. Salmon, Parent-Offspring Conflict, in FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: AN Evo-
LUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE, 145, 157 (Catherine A. Salmon & Todd K. Shackelford eds., 2008).
106. Id. at 156. While further study may make the behavioral reasons for adoptive par-
enting more apparent, the task of defending an entire discipline by reconciling adoptive
behavior with sociobiology is not a task for this Note, and is best left to leaders in the field.
See, e.g., Laura Hamilton, Simon Cheng & Brian Powell, Adoptive Parents, Adaptive Parents:
Evaluating the Importance of Biological Ties for Parental Investment, 72 Am. Soc. REv. 95 (2007).
107. Beverly I. Strassman & Ruth Mace, Perspectives on Human Health and Disease from Evo-
lutionary and Behavioral Ecology, in EVOLUTION IN HEALTH AND DISEASE 109, 113 (Stephen C.
Stearns &Jacob C. Koella eds., 2d ed. 2008); Hamilton, Cheng & Powell, supra note 106, at
99-100 ("In the past, humans had fewer resources and often lived in close kin networks. The
presence of a genetic stranger was unlikely. Now, however, humans' 'innate psychological
predispositions that promote an intense desire for children [may] permit the formation of
close relationships with infants and children of strangers.' These underlying mechanisms
may actually (if accidentally) facilitate adoption. As a result of these evolutionary blunders,
adoptive parents may invest as if their children were their own biological sons and daugh-
ters." (quoting Joan B. Silk, Human Adoption in Evolutionary Perspective, I HUM. NATURE 25,
39 (1990)).
108. See discussion infra Part V.B.
109. It has not always been the case that the state took a role in the social policy of
adoption. Modem adoptions, which emphasize child welfare over the interests of the
adopter, are a uniquely American invention, and state activity in promoting adoption did
not occur in earnest until the 1950s and 1960s, when "larger social themes of post-war opti-
mism and mobility" encouraged social workers to push for adoption's "prominent role as
social policy." BARBARA MELOSH, STRANGERS AND KIN: THE AMERICAN WAY OF ADOPTION 4
(2002).
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the development of legal systems." One strain of current scholar-
ship identifies longstanding policies that comport with the
principles of evolutionary biology, and then analyzes laws in that
context. A second strain identifies potential reforms comporting
with or justified by these same principles, and argues for their
adoption. Both types of scholarship bolster the argument for the
adoption of the investment theory of recovery: the former because
it demonstrates that behaviors associated with kin selection have
been the basis of a variety of successful and ancient laws; the latter
because it posits that certain benefits result when the legal system is
responsive to basic human behaviors. First, however, it is important
to recognize the perils of mixing evolutionary biology and law.
1. The Pitfalls of Evolutionary Analysis in Law
The use of evolutionary analysis in the law got off to a rocky
start. In Lochner v. New York, Justice Holmes famously rejected the
survival-of-the-fittest theory"'. advanced by the bakeries against
their overworked bakers:
The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does
not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which
has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is inter-
fered with by school laws, by the Postoffice [sic], by every state
or municipal institution which takes his money for purposes
thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The 14th
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Stat-
ics.
112
Holmes's pronouncement clearly rejects the notion that human
laws should commingle with newfound notions of animal behavior.
Yet Holmes would alter his position three years later when he
joined in the unanimous decision in Muller v. Oregon."l1 The Court
buttressed its decision permitting state laws that limit hours for
women laborers by noting both the physiological differences be-
tween genders and the notion that "[t]he physical well-being of
110. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
111. The phrase "survival of the fittest" was coined by Herbert Spencer, but is not com-
pletely coextensive with natural selection, as the latter includes sexual selection. See 1
HERBERT SPENCER, THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY 444 (1864).
112. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); HERBERT
SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS: OR, THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL To HAPPINESS SPECIFIED, AND
THE FIRST OF THEM DEVELOPED (1851).
113. 208 U.S. 412 (1906).
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woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to
preserve the strength and vigor of the race.' ' 4 Certainly Holmes
had changed his views by the time he wrote the majority in Buck v.
Bell,"' upholding a statute that forced sterilization on the mentally
retarded:
The judgment finds the facts that have been recited and that
Carrie Buck 'is the probable potential parent of socially in-
adequate offspring, likewise afflicted, that she may be sexually
sterilized without detriment to her general health and that
her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterili-
zation,' and thereupon makes the order.... It is better for all
the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate off-
spring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility,
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from con-
tinuing their kind.... Three generations of imbeciles are
enough." 6
There has been considerable advancement in the sophistication
of both legal systems and evolutionary analysis since the days of
Justice Holmes,"' but some modem commentaries remain cautious
on the use of evolutionary analysis in the law. For one, the notion
that basic biological principles can predict human behavior smacks
of reductionism." s A second criticism follows the concept de-
scribed in Part III.A: many human behaviors are maladaptive, and
certainly at a higher rate than for other animals since human habi-
tats have changed rapidly in relation to the evolutionary
timescale." 9 In codifying laws responding to an evolutionary analy-
sis of human behaviors, lawmakers run the risk of reinforcing
maladaptive behaviors beyond their natural end. Finally, "[m]aking
a claim or giving evidence that a behavior has evolved ... says
nothing about how such a behavior should be viewed from a moral
114. Id at 421.
115. 274U.S.200 (1927).
116. Id.at207.
117. And there have been blunders. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's misguided
approach to racism and eugenics in the 1940s, see DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OFJUS-
TICE: THE SUPREME COURT'S 200-YEAR STRUGGLE TO INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE LAW
130-60 (2004).
118. See DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN'S DANGEROUS IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEAN-
INGS OF LIFE, 81 (1995) ("[Slocieties are composed of human beings, who, as mammals,
must fall under the principles of biology that cover all mammals.... No sane scientist dis-
putes this bland reading; the assembled Justices of the Supreme Court are as bound by the
law of gravity as is any avalanche, because they are, in the end, also a collection of physical
objects.").
119. Barkow et al., supra note 96, at 625-26.
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stance. In fact, using what is to justify what ought to be is referred
to as the naturalistic fallacy." 20 One can make a conceptual distinc-
tion between a "good" in the evolutionary realm (i.e., a condition
or impetus propagating traits useful for survival) and a "good" in
the broader sense of human social values (i.e., an ethical good). 21
Put another way, an evolutionary fact does not necessarily have ex-
istential meaning, though it has often served as a proxy for
meaning throughout human history.
12
Still, there has been a resounding cry from scholars for the inte-
gration of biology and law, and there is currently a synthesis
occurring between the Law and Economics and the Law and Biol-
ogy movements. 12 Scholars are calling for integration between our
understanding of human behavior with how we react to those be-
haviors in law. Professor Owen D. Jones, one of the leaders of the
Law and Biology movement, explains:
It is entirely unclear to me that, in the end, even the imper-
fect introduction of behavioral biology into legal thinking
would be more costly than unduly delaying that introduction,
if the window on human behavior thereby gained may afford
us some meaningful opportunity to reduce behaviors that we
deem detrimental, and to encourage behaviors we deem con-
structive. 24
2. Embracing an Evolutionary Explanation
for the Origin of Law
Professor Owen D. Jones has dedicated several recent articles to
an evolutionary analysis of property rights and the endowment ef-
120. Salmon & Shackelford, supra note 5, at 3-4.
121. See Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 485 ("One cannot move from facts to nor-
mative conclusions without passing through a prism of human values. Values arise, of
course, from many social and political influences. And, perhaps confusingly at first, some
values are themselves inevitably influenced by biological and evolutionary processes. But
wherever values come from, it is clear that facts are never good or bad in themselves.").
122. See id. at 484-85.
123. For a discussion concerning Gary S. Becker's integration of biology and econom-
ics, see infra note 157 and accompanying text. See also Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe,
The Brain and the Law, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON Bio. Sci. 1727
(2004); E. Donald Elliott, The Genome and the Law: Should Increased Genetic Knowledge Change
the Law, 25 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61 (2001); infra note 176 and accompanying text.
124. Owen D.Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: Some Objections Considered, 67 BROOK. L.
REv. 207, 225 (2001).
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fect.1 2 5 The ability of an individual to defend and maintain territory,
and to exploit the natural resources and mating opportunities
within that territory, are of obvious importance in natural selec-
tion. 2 6 Human property rights, both for real property and
accumulated wealth, issue in some part from this evolutionary
principle. 7 The ancient doctrine of primogeniture, for example,
can also be seen as a rule comporting with evolutionary behavior:
the first-born son, having survived the longest, is also the son most
likely to bear traits necessary for survival and, by extension, most
likely to be successful in reproducing. 28
A second example can be found in the law of intestacy, which
appears very early in legal history, and is likely much older still.'29
The law, adopted in some fashion by most states, provides for in-
heritance of an intestate decedent by the "next of kin," sometimes
with limitations for inheritance by distant relatives:30
In recognition of the nearly universal desire to favor descen-
dants, and in particular, children, the law has created the
doctrine of undue influence to overturn gifts to nonlineal de-
scendants, second spouses, lovers, friends, loyal housekeepers,
125. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones et al., Endowment Effects in Chimpanzees, 17 CURRENT BIOL-
OGY 1704 (2007) (exploring the evolutionary underpinnings of the endowment effect);
Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics
Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1141, 1154 (2001) (describing "endowment ef-
fect[s]" as "certain psychological inertia" affecting "the final allocation [of resources]
irrespective of transaction costs" [in Coase Theorem analysis]).
126. Cf BERNARD CAMPBELL, HUMAN EVOLUTION 346 (4th ed. 1998) (describing the
tendency of primate species to defend an "area containing resources absolutely essential for
survival").
127. SeeJones & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 474; see also MICHAEL GILBERT, THE DIs-
POSABLE MALE: SEX, LOVE, AND MONEY-YOUR WORLD THROUGH DARWIN'S EYES 83 (2006)
("Over time, as ... human groupings grew larger, social issues became more complex....
Almost all communities endorse some concept of individual property and develop rules of
succession and inheritance."); Jones, supra note 125, at 1193.
128. Lawrence Frolik notes that "[mierely having children is not enough [to satisfy de-
sire for a genetic legacy], [flor they must be raised to maturity and be established well
enough that they in turn can carry on the family line." Lawrence A. Frolik, The Biological
Roots of the Undue Influence Doctrine: What's Love Got to Do with Itt, 57 U. Pirr. L. REv. 841, 874,
877 n.194 (1996) ("Primogeniture has been explained in Darwinian terms as the means by
which a wealthy father, by leaving everything to one son, gives him the economic status and
means to become a successful adulterer and beget many bastard children. A wealthy daugh-
ter gains no such advantage."). See Sugiyama, supra note 84, at 295-303. For a general
discussion on the policy considerations behind intestacy laws and inheritance, see David V.
DeRosa, Intestate Succession and the Laughing Heir: Who Do We Want to Get the Last Laugh, 12
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 153 (1997).
129. DeRosa, supra note 128, at 154-55 (describing Roman and Biblical laws of intes-
tacy).
130. Id. at 153-54.
WINTER 2010]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
and the like, and, relying on intestacy laws, direct the inheri-
tance to the testator's descendants.'
31
The effect of the law is to promote the distribution of an individ-
ual's collected resources to those who share his bloodline (and,
unconsciously, the effect is to increase the resources available to
those bearing the individual's genes); it promotes his inclusive fit-
ness after death by increasing the resources his offspring or other
relatives will expend on their own inclusive fitness:
The attraction and the stability of the undue influence doc-
trine are attributable to its grounding in basic, instinctual
human attitudes towards one's offspring. Simply put, it is hu-
man nature for decedents to promote the interests of their
descendants even if others ... seem more deserving based
upon their behavior
Reasoning by analogy, an investment theory of recovery should be
attractive because it too is "ground[ed] in basic, instinctual atti-
tudes towards one's offspring."
The integration of law and biology can also be seen in recent
scholarship related to other areas of law. The Gruter Institute, es-
tablished in 1981 by Margaret Gruter, is an example of the
increased scholarly focus on integrating law and biology more gen-
erally. 3' The Institute has supported the use of evolutionary
analysis in studying the foundations and history of law in many ar-
eas-rape statutes, child support laws, notions of fairness,
prostitution laws-all while operating under the central tenant that
"human legal behavior is both facilitated and constrained by our
biological nature.' 34 The Institute's stated mission is to promote
"[i] nterdisciplinary research and teaching designed to inform law,
economics, and other social sciences about the latest scientific
findings about human behavior.... [S]cientists associated with the
Institute see a need for the law and other social sciences to be in-
formed about the biological bases of human behavior.... 1 3 5 The
existence of the Institute would seem to indicate that, at least with
131. Frolik, supra note 128, at 843.
132. Id.
133. See GRUTER INST. FOR LAW & BEHAV. RES., MISSION: ADVANCING INTERDISCIPLI-
NARY RESEARCH AND TEACHING IN LAW AND THE BIOLOGICALLY INFORMED BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES, http://www.gruter.org/index.php?option=com-content&task--view&id=31&Itemid
-88888936 (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).




regard to certain areas of legal scholarship, the momentum for the
synthesis between law and evolutionary analysis is increasing.
IV. MAKING THE PLAINTIFF WHOLE: THE INTERSECTION OF
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND INCLUSIVE FITNESS
The biological argument for adoption of the investment the-
ory is the same as the biological rationale for a tort system more
generally. In their 2005 article, Law and Behavioral Biology, Owen
D. Jones and Timothy H. Goldsmith identify the "evolutionarily-
influenced concerns" of several areas of law.'36 Property law, for
example, issues from the evolutionary concern of controlling
private resources; procedural law is a way to efficiently solve
intra-group conflicts; and tort law responds to the evolutionary
concern of non-injury to "body; resources; [and] reputation."
137
Each system of modern law, on some level, is designed to effect a
protective barrier of incentives and disincentives around an
individual's fitness. Jones and Goldsmith explain:
We inevitably tend ... to care most about things that were
relevant to survival and reproduction throughout evolution-
ary time. For instance, ... [w]e seek to be secure in both our
property and in our bodies, and this desire likely helped give
general form to criminal law and tort law.... These features
are almost undoubtedly an outgrowth of the effects of evolu-
tionary processes on human brains functioning in social
environments.' 
3
A. Corrective Justice Theory & Biology
The corrective justice theory of torts proposes that the purpose
of damages is "to place the plaintiff in the position that she would
have enjoyed if the tort had never been committed.' 39 In Sullivan
v. Old Colony Street Railway Co., Justice Rugg, for the majority of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, wrote that the system of awarding
damages to torts plaintiffs is "[a] practical instrumentality for the
administration of justice. The principle on which it is founded is
136. Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at474.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 467-68.
139. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 774 (8th ed. 2004).
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compensation. Its object is to afford the equivalent in money for
the actual loss caused by the wrong of another."
140
While seemingly disparate areas of study, population genetics
and evolutionary psychology share an undeniable link with correc-
tive justice theory: the foundational texts of both disciplines
originated in the same man, Aristotle. Aristotle's History of Animals
marks, to many, the inception of zoology,41 and he developed the
theory of corrective justice in his Nicomachean Ethics-
Hence the unjust being here the unequal, the judge endeav-
ours to equalize it: inasmuch as when one man has received
and the other has inflicted a blow, or one has killed and the
other been killed, the line representing the suffering and do-
ing of the deed is divided into unequal parts, but the judge
endeavours to make them equal by the penalty or loss he im-
poses, taking away the gain.
4 2
The scholarship of corrective justice builds on Aristotle's concep-
tion, and proposes that the goal of torts damages is to "restor[e] a
preexisting equilibrium."
1 43
Investment theory, when placed in the context of biology, corre-
sponds with corrective justice because it returns lost fitness to the
investor, balancing the equilibrium. The value awarded to the par-
ent-plaintiffs in Wycko can be cast as the replacement value for
viable offspring.144 In theory, the parent-plaintiffs have been re-
stored their parental investment and will now have the ability to
redistribute the investment to other offspring or kin, thereby in-
creasing their inclusive fitness to an approximation of what it was
140. 83 N.E. 1091, 1092 (Mass. 1908).
141. See, e.g., VERN L. BULLOUGH, SCIENCE IN THE BEDROOM: A HISTORY OF SEX RE-
SEARCH 9 (1994) ("Historically, the most influential premodern author on sexual activity
among animals ... was ... Aristotle, whose History of Animals ... can be regarded as the
foundation ... of Western zoology ... ."); RICHARD OWEN, THE HUNTERIAN LECTURES IN
COMPARATIVE ANATOMY: MAY-JUNE 1837 91 (Phillip Reid Sloan ed., 1992) ("Zoological
Science sprang from [Aristotle's] labours, we may almost say, like Minerva from the Head of
Jove, in a state of noble and splendid maturity." (citations omitted)).
142. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 275, Bekker no. 1132a4 (H. Rackham
trans., 1926) (citations omitted).
143. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 461 (2004). For a more in-depth analysis of corrective justice
and the theoretical concept of making tort plaintiffs "whole," see ErnestJ. Weinrib, Corrective
Justice in a Nutshell 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349 (2002). For a defense and explanation of the
current posture of corrective justice theory, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality
and the Emerging Consensus on CorrectiveJustice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107 (2001).
144. See generally Gangemi v. Nat'l Health Labs, 677 A.2d 1163 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996) (holding that evidence of the replacement value of domestic services is admissible in
determining damages for wrongful death).
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before the death of their child. 145 Genetic relatedness-the ratio of
common genes between two individuals-correlates with the
amount of resources an individual will invest in the success of rela-
tives.46 J. B. S. Haldane, the father of population genetics and one
of the earliest ethologists to develop a theory of kin selection, once
said that he would not risk his life to save his drowning brother, but
"would to save two brothers, or eight cousins.' 47 The same model
might be applied to the distribution of damages, granting a per-
centage of the recovery to each surviving relative commensurate
with their genetic relatedness. Alternatively, courts could just as
readily restore inclusive fitness by granting the award to whoever
can prove an investment in the decedent, since this latter quanta
will likely correspond with genetic relatedness anyway.148
By adopting the investment theory of damages, the law would
create an incentive barrier to deadly tortious conduct. Aristotle's
theory of corrective justice speaks of a "gain" by the actor commit-
ting the tortious conduct. 149 In modern terms, the gain has often
been cast as the increased liberty of the tortious actor in committing
145. Cf Neal v. Saga Shipping Co., 407 F.2d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 1969) (approving of fam-
ily's recovery "[flor the loss of nurture and guidance .... " after death of husband and
father).
146. Kermyt G. Anderson, Relatedness and Investment in Children in South Africa, 16 HUM.
NATURE 1, 2 (2005). Using a sample size of over 11,000, Anderson "randomly selected one
child from each household ... and calculated the average genetic relatedness of the other
household members to the focal child." Id. at 1. He then "examine[d] whether the coeffi-
cient of relatedness predicts greater household expenditures on food, on health care, and
on children's clothing.... The results are consistent with an inclusive fitness model: House-
holds invest more in children who are more closely related." Id. While there is sure to be
variation in parenting behaviors across cultures, one would nonetheless expect the more
general implication to hold true across national boundaries due, ostensibly, to the connec-
tion between the origin of parenting behavior and genetic relatedness. Although adoption
behaviors obviously depart from this correlation, the variation can be explained by acknowl-
edging that parental behaviors developed (in evolutionary scale) in the context of genetic
families and are now being exhibited outside of that context due to changes in social or
cultural mores. For a discussion regarding investment in children by non-genetic relatives,
see supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
147. RICHARD McELREATH & ROBERT BOYD, MATHEMATICAL MODELS OF SOCIAL Evo-
LUTION: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 82 (2007) (quoting Haldane). Haldane had
calculated the ratios of genetic relatedness of two brothers (with whom he would share half
of his alleles) or eight cousins (with whom he would share one-eighth) and then computed
the number that would be required to match his own sacrifice. This mathematical formula
was provided formally by the evolutionary biologist W.D. Hamilton, in Hamilton's Rule,
which posits that "altruism is favoured when rb-c>0, where cis the fitness cost to the altruist, b
is the fitness benefit to the recipient and ris their genetic relatedness." See West, Gardner &
Griffin, supra note 100, at R482. One can see that Haldane slightly underestimated the exact
number of relatives required, since the formula dictates that self-sacrifice will only be fa-
vored where the resulting benefit is greater than rather than equal to zero (requiring 3
brothers or 9 cousins).
148. SeeAnderson, supra note 146.
149. ARISTOTLE, supranote 142, at275, Bekkerno. 1132a4.
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the tort. 50 In an inclusive fitness sense, the gain by the tortious ac-
tor might be seen differently if one starts from a premise that the
world has limited resources, and that the more members of a spe-
cies in existence, the more effort is required to obtain an equal
apportionment of those limited resources. By killing (whether neg-
ligently or otherwise) another member of the species, one not only
lessens the effort he will have to undertake to obtain an equal
share of resources, but increases the fitness of his own offspring,
who will no longer have to compete with the dead individual or his
progeny for the limited resources. In this framework, a torts rem-
edy reduces the tortious actor's incremental benefit and instead
reflexively damages his individual fitness. By threatening the bad
actor with a loss of inclusive fitness, investment theory reconfigures
his calculation of what behaviors are in his own self-interest.1 If
applied over time, it could, in theory, "select out" behaviors result-
ing in tortious con ct.,2
Aspects of investment theory are in tension, however, with the
theory of natural selection. One could argue that the decedent lost
the game of natural selection. Certainly intra-species competition is
a form of selective pressure, 153 and individuals without the traits to
outlast the dangerous behaviors of other members of their species
are, arguably, just as fairly cast as victims of selection as they are
victims of tortious conduct. Where do we draw the line between
"natural selection loser" and "tort claimant?" This argument misses
two notions about law and humanity. First, law is, in its most basic
and beautiful sense, a human effort to reduce intra-species selec-
tive pressure. 14 Second, comparative liability regimes currently
employed in tort law mean that the final recovery can take into ac-
count and "select" against the decedent's own behaviors. The
150. See GOLDBERG, SEBOK & ZIPURSKY, supra note 143, at 461.
151. See Richard A. Epstein, The Varieties of Self-Interest, 8 Soc. PHIL. & POLY 102, 102
(1990) ("The initial inquiry asks why self-interest (to be suitably qualified to take into ac-
count inclusive fitness) is regarded as a constant of human behavior. The explanation
derives more from the biological and less from the social. The powerful pressures of natural
selection weed out any organisms for whom (genetic) self-interest is not the paramount
consideration." (citation omitted)).
152. SeeJones & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 477-79. The mechanism is obvious: the tort
actor loses fitness because he or she loses financial resources; the reduced fitness correlates
with a reduced representation of the gene or behavior in the next generation. Because the
selection pressure would have to be applied equally and applied over many generations, it
seems unlikely that legal policy would have any meaningful effect on the distribution of
heritable traits related to tortious conduct, though somewhat more likely that it would affect
the distribution of habituated behavior.
153. See generally MICHAEL BEGON, MARTIN MORTIMER & DAVIDJ. THOMPSON, POPULA-
TION ECOLOGY: A UNIFIED STUDY OF ANIMALS AND PLANrs 29-37 (3d ed. 1996).
154. SeeJones & Goldsmith, supra note 7, at 477-79.
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ability of a system to compensate the loser in intra-species selection
correlates to the individual's risk assessment when spending re-
sources to shield his fitness: if he can act with the knowledge that
the system will restore his fitness when a human causes his loss, he
will be more likely to allocate resources to shield himself against
other selective pressures. 5' Adoption of the investment theory of
recovery would promote a social system-a system of laws-that
reduces expenditures on human rivalry, and instead combines
those human efforts that contribute to common survival.
B. Support From Other Integrated Fields
Some in the Law and Economics movement have also advanced
an investment theory of recovery. Both Richard Posner and Nobel-
prize winning economist Gary Becker have proposed investment
theory as a viable method for compensating survivors in wrongful
death actions. In An Economic Analysis of Law, Posner writes:
A minimum estimate of the parents' loss, which could be used
as the basis for the award of damage to them, is their invest-
ment (of both money and time, the latter monetizable on the
basis of market opportunity costs) in the rearing of the child
up to the date of its death.
156
Becker echoed similar sentiments in A Treatise on the Family.
15
Becker's analysis of investment theory, which started as early as
1960, 151 is extended in A Treatise on the Family to include the notion
of "dynastic utility"-"a parental anticipation that unborn genera-
tions provide a kind of living monument to deceased ancestors.'
5 9
155. See id. at 463-64. Jones and Goldsmith's "Law of Law's Leverage" is conceptually
similar to the notion that humans expend resources and adopt behaviors because of the
risks associated with various selective pressures.
156. RICHARD POSNER, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 150-51 (2d ed. 1977).
157. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981). Becker's analysis of human
behavior and its relationship to economics is expansive. See Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The
Economic Way of Lookingat Behavior, 101J. POL. ECON. 385 (1993); Gary S. Becker, Fertility and
the Economy, 5 J. POPULATION ECON. 185 (1992); Gary S. Becker, A Reformulation of the Eco-
nomic Theory of Fertility, 103 Q.J. ECON. 1 (1988); Gary S. Becker, Altruism in the Family and
Selfishness in the Market Place, 48 ECONOMICA 1 (1981); Gary S. Becker, Altruism, Egoism, and
Genetic Fitness: Economics and Sociobiolog,, 14J. ECON. LITERATURE 817 (1976).
158. Gary S. Becker, An Economic Analysis of Fertility, in DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC
CHANGE IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 209, 226-28 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1960).
159. Thomas R. Ireland & John 0. Ward, Valuing the Life of a Child: Broadening the In-
vestment Approach, 7J. FORENSIC ECON. 179, 179 n.1 (1994) (describing BECKER, A TREATISE
ON THE FAMILY, supra note 157).
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This concept parallels inclusive fitness, albeit in a discourse void of
the terms commonly used in biology.
In their article, Valuing the Life of a Child: Broadening the Investment
Approach, Thomas R. Ireland and John 0. Ward promote the in-
vestment approach to a theory of damages because parental
investment "is a much more meaningful indicator of the value par-
ents place on a child than any estimate of lost services and
financial support."'60 What better calculation of the value of a
child's life, they posit, than the "'willingness to pay' calculation" of
the amount parents have contributed to raising the child?.'. Ire-
land and Ward argue that investment costs should be measured
over the life of the child to the age of majority-notjust to the date
of death, but instead to the age of twenty-one-reasoning "[w] hat
the parents lost is the flow of benefits that would have accrued
throughout their life-times, including dynastic possibilities of
grandchildren and future generations, not the amount they had
already invested."
162
This notion, however, misses the forest for the trees: once one
accepts there are other avenues for getting genes into the next
generation, say by investing in other relatives and thereby increas-
ing inclusive fitness, the death of a child no longer means the end
of "dynastic possibilities." Restoring a lost investment in one child
allows for a new investment in other relatives (short the opportu-
nity costs), and "inclusive fitness" recognizes these lateral relatives,
such as brothers and sisters, as avenues to genetic representation in
the world at large. Siblings who have lost their own individual in-
vestments in a deceased brother or sister can be made whole by
receiving damages that return their investment, since they can in-
vest that money in themselves (directly increasing their own
fitness) or other relatives (increasing their inclusive fitness and,
because they are related to the decedent, the decedent's inclusive
fitness as well). The conceptual web of genetic relatedness among
family members assures that a returned investment will be spread
throughout the meshwork of genes, and the decedent's dynastic
interests will survive his death.
160. Id. at 179.
161. Id. at 180.
162. Id. at 181.
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C. Application Beyond Wrongful Death Actions of Minors
Inclusive fitness justifications would also permit recovery for the
deaths of elderly relatives or relatives who have lost their capacity
for fecundity. Investment usually flows down the family tree, but
some portion of it is returned by younger generations as they
strengthen their assets in older relatives. Grandparents, aside from
being a reservoir of useful information and skills, play an impor-
tant role in human childcare as surrogates for busy parents,163 and
non-reproductive relatives can increase their own fitness by invest-
ing their time in the offspring of other relatives. The Michigan
Court of Appeals may have put it best five years after Wycko, when
they affirmed an award of damages to adult children for the
wrongful death of their parents:
A family unit, including all of its members, whether living un-
der the same roof or not, is still a family unit. As a rule parents
as they grow older acquire more wisdom and appreciation for
their children, grandchildren, and the family unit. This en-
ables them to exert through their concern, love, and
companionship valuable guidance to the other members of
the family, and strengthen the effective service of the family as
a unit.' 64
Since children are not likely to make large investments in parents,
the investment theory of recovery would likely result in a small
award.
Recovery would also be justified at the other end of life, where
mothers could demonstrate the wrongful death of viable fetuses.
In Jones v. Karraker, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld a jury
award of $125,000 for the wrongful death of a viable fetus due to
medical malpractice. 165 Deciding that limiting damages for a
163. The "Grandmother Hypothesis" proposes a model whereby the average human
lifespan was extended as a result of selection for family groups who had older, non-
reproductive females who could invest in grandchildren while reproductive mothers shifted
investments to increased reproduction. See, e.g., Kristen Hawkes et al., The Grandmother Hy-
pothesis and Human Evolution, in ADAPTATION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE 237 (Lee Cronk et al. eds., 2000); Nick Blurton Jones et al., Older Hadza Men
and Women as Helpers: Residence Data, in HUNTER-GATHERER CHILDHOODS 214, 220-24 (Barry
S. Hewlett & Michael E. Lamb eds., 2005).
164. Westfall v. Venton, 137 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Mich. Ct. App. 1965).
165. 457 N.E.2d 23 (Il. 1983). Cf Christopher P. Edwards, Note, DiDonato v. Wortman
and Wrongful Death of a Viable Fetus in North Carolina: The Case Against Unreasonably Restricting
Damages, 66 N.C. L. REv. 1291, 1299 (1988) ("[Bly 1986 thirty-five jurisdictions had afforded
estates of viable fetuses the opportunity to recover damages by way of wrongful death ac-
tions."). The mother's cause of action for the cost of pregnancy would not, however, be part
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child-including an unborn fetus-was better left to legislative
pronouncement, 166 the court upheld the verdict without analysis as
to the pecuniary loss to the mother, or any mention of a special
relationship between a mother and an unborn fetus.167 The jury in
Karraker could not have relied on a theory of pecuniary loss; a fetus
cannot provide financial support through wages or earning.""'
Neither could it have relied on an investment theory similar to the
one put forth in Wycko, 169 where the child survived birth and the
parent-plaintiff spent money raising the child for fourteen years. It
is also not likely that the jury relied on the concept of genetic in-
vestment as posited by evolutionary psychologists. Still, underneath
their determination that a viable fetus was worth $125,000 must
exist some tacit acknowledgment that parents value their own
healthy children.
Certainly a fetus does represent an investment by the mother.
70
Mammalian mothers expend significant energy, time, and undergo
physiological strain to produce a viable fetus. I71 In cases like
Karraker, where negligence results in the death of an otherwise vi-
able fetus, the costs of employing and providing medical fees for a
surrogate mother are a good proxy for the value lost. 72 The oppor-
tunity costs associated with the time spent on a non-viable fetus are
also likely to be high, especially given the planning that human
mothers put into pregnancy and the spacing of births. Moreover,
certain costs, related to courtship and family planning, are in-
curred prior to conception.7 3 At least one court has refused to
of the fetus' estate; that action would have to fall into some special consideration for third
parties under an investment theory like that in Wycko.
166. Karraker, 457 N.E.2d at 25.
167. Id. at 24-26.
168. Some courts have given compensation for the wrongful death of minors without
requiring any demonstration of quantifiable investment. See, e.g., Haumersen v. Ford Motor
Co., 257 N.w.2d 7, 17-18 (Iowa 1977) (finding the plaintiff-parents did not need to present
evidence of the cost of maintenance in minority for recovery for nonspecific loss of ser-
vices); Lake Erie & W.R. Co. v. Chriss, 105 N.E. 62, 63-64 (Ind. App. 1914) ("[W]here the
facts as to the age, sex, education, health, disposition, and general characteristics of the
child are proven, and the situation and condition in life of the parents ... are shown, there
is evidence from which the jury... may assess substantial pecuniary damages...
169. Wyckov. Gnodtke, 105 N.W.2d 118,122-23 (Mich. 1960).
170. Fathers are also likely to make a significant investment in the health of a fetus
(e.g., by providing resources to the pregnant mother).
171. GEOFFREY MILLER, THE MATING MIND: How SEXUAL CHOICE SHAPED THE EVOLU-
TION OF HUMAN NATURE 86 (2001).
172. See Lorraine Ali & Raina Kelley, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7,
2008, at 45 ("[Tlypically, surrogacy agreements in the United States involve payments of
$20,000 to $25,000 to the woman who bears the child.").
173. See Trivers, Parental Investment, supra note 83, at 145-50 ("In the human species, for
example, a copulation costing the male virtually nothing may trigger a nine-month invest-
ment by the female that is not trivial .... After a nine-month pregnancy, a female is more or
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extend a claim for wrongful death to the loss of pre-embryos not
implanted in a mother's womb, reasoning that viability is a prereq-
uisite to wrongful death.1 74 It is possible to make a mother-plaintiff
whole, at least in a corrective justice sense, in a wrongful death ac-
tion for the loss of her fetus; Karraker represents an attempt by a
jury to do just that, and the award comports with the notion of ge-
netic investment1
5
The Wycko court could not explicitly rely on biological theories
of the value of children as a justification for compensation. The
lexicon did not exist in 1960, nor the advanced scholarship pro-
moting a synthesis between evolutionary psychology and law. 76 But
the argument does not require that the Wyckojury was alert or even
conscious to the evolutionary origins of their intuitions about sur-
vival or reproduction. It is a feature of the scholarship of
behavioral biology that the explanation follows the behavior,'77 and,
in this case, the evolutionary explanation followed the legal behav-
ior of the Wyckojury.
CONCLUSION
Investment theory is consistent with corrective justice when
placed in the context of the biological concept of inclusive fitness,
and the current synthesis between law and biology supports its
adoption to help quantify recovery in wrongful death cases. Nei-
ther Justice Talbot Smith, nor the jury sitting in Berrien County,
Michigan in 1959, could have used inclusive fitness as a justifica-
tion for granting John Wycko, Sr. the cost of raising his son to the
less free to terminate her investment at any moment but doing so wastes her investment up
until then.").
174. Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1265, 1271-72 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (up-
holding plaintiffs action for the negligent destruction of the pre-embryos). But see Wiersma
v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996) ("Parents may seek redress regardless of
whether their unborn child was viable.").
175. For an example of a court acknowledging the importance of genetic relatedness
and the related costs of pregnancy, seeJohnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (awarding
maternal rights to the genetic mother rather than the surrogate mother under California's
parentage statute). There are scenarios in which mothers make investments in fetuses which
are not genetically their own (as a surrogate or as a woman implanted with an egg of an-
other woman fertilized by her husband). Women in this situation have demonstrated
Ireland and Ward's "willingness to pay." See supra text accompanying notes 160-162. They
have also demonstrated the same "parental and cultural desires" which buttress the argu-
ment for recovery in the case of other adoptive parents. See supra text accompanying notes
105-110.
176. See E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 595
(1997).
177. See ALCOCK, supra note 82, at 24.
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age of fourteen. In 1959, they did not even have Becker's analysis
of the loss of "dynastic utility." 78 Instead, the jury looked at Wycko
and saw a man who had lost both of his sons to the negligence of
another, and understood, in an ancient and fundamental sense,
that this meant the end of his direct line.19 Today, we have this
same intuition, but it is now buttressed by a deeper understanding
through biology of how and why humans invest in one another.
This understanding gives us not only the reasoning, but also the
impetus to adopt an investment theory model of recovery in
wrongful death cases.
178. Ireland & Ward, supra note 159, at 179 n. 1 (discussing BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE
FAMILY, supra note 157).
179. Courts have struggled to articulate a reason that explains this intuition. See discus-
sion supra note 168.
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